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Abstract— Several theoretical and empirical models 
have been developed to examine how risk aversion 
affects compliance with agri-environmental schemes 
under asymmetric information and uncertainty. 
However, none has examined the case where the level of 
compliance is a continuous variable and producers face 
simultaneous monitoring, output price and production 
uncertainty. Treating conservation effort as a 
continuous variable, we show that risk aversion can 
mitigate the moral hazard problem in most cases. 
However, if conservation effort has a risk-increasing 
impact on production the effect of risk aversion on 
compliance is ambiguous. 
Keywords— Agri-environmental schemes, uncertainty, 
moral hazard 
I. INTRODUCTION  
There is increasing interest in the use of agri-
environmental programmes to improve environmental 
quality. Many existing schemes use fixed incentive 
payments and/or cost sharing to encourage farmers to 
reduce negative externalities associated with 
agricultural activities or to increase positive 
externalities and the supply of environmental public 
goods. Examples of such voluntary agri-environmental 
schemes include the Environmentally Sensitive Areas 
Scheme (ESAS), the Countryside Stewardship Scheme 
(CSS), and the German MEKA programme
1  in 
Europe. In the United States, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture administers the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), the Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program (EQIP), and several other programmes. 
A key issue in the design of incentive-based agri-
environmental schemes is asymmetric information - 
the agri-environmental agency (AEA) does not have 
access to information possessed by farmers and/or can 
only observe their actions imperfectly. This creates the 
                                                           
1 Marktentlastungs- und Kulturlandschaftsausgleichsprogramm. 
potential for adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection can result in overpayment and 
limited environmental benefits since farmers have an 
incentive to hide information about agri-environmental 
characteristics or, even worse, may misrepresent their 
potential contribution to environmental quality in 
order to obtain higher payments. Moral hazard occurs 
due to imperfect information on compliance. The AEA 
may only be able to monitor participating farmers 
incompletely due to budgetary limitations or may face 
difficulties in verifying compliance, some farmers may 
choose not to fulfil their contractual obligations while 
receiving payments. Since both hidden information 
and hidden action will result in reduced outcomes, 
addressing information asymmetry is indispensable to 
the design of agri-environmental schemes. 
Several authors have addressed the issue of 
information asymmetry, focusing primarily on adverse 
selection (Spubler [1]; Chambers [2]; Bourgeon et al. 
[3]; Wu and Babcock [4]; Latacz-Lohmann and Van 
der Hamsvoort [5]; Moxey et al. [6]). As Choe and 
Fraser [7] observe, moral hazard and compliance 
monitoring have received far less attention. Economic 
inefficiencies due to moral hazard in agri-
environmental policy are analysed by Ozanne et al. [8] 
through a framework based on work by Moxey et al. 
The authors conclude that the moral hazard problem 
may have been exaggerated due to the failure to 
consider the impact of risk aversion. In the context of 
land set-aside provisions, Fraser [9] shows that risk 
aversion can increase the likelihood of compliance 
with agri-environmental schemes under monitoring 
and output price uncertainty. He also demonstrates 
that non-compliance can be reduced by changing 
inversely the size of penalty and the probability of 
inspection, holding the expected penalty constant. Hart 
and Latacz-Lohmann [10] allow for variations in 
farmers' compliance costs and in their willingness to 
cheat. In these articles, however, discrete choice 
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models (i.e., farmers can choose only two or three 
actions: non-participation, compliance or non-
compliance) have been employed and a single 
stochastic variable (output price) is considered as a 
source of farm-income variability. The impact of 
production risk on compliance has not been examined. 
Fraser mentions production uncertainty, but does not 
incorporate it explicitly in his model. If both output 
price and production uncertainty exist, results obtained 
by previous studies may not hold. 
Several authors have examined the impact of risk 
aversion on input use under production uncertainty 
(e.g., Feder [11]; Loehman and Nelson [12]). In more 
recent analysis, Isik [13] allows for both output price 
and production uncertainty within a production 
function originally specified by Just and Pope [14] to 
examine the impact of environmental policies on input 
use, but focuses on the case where the two stochastic 
variables are uncorrelated. When producers face 
production uncertainty, a risk-input relationship which 
captures how changes in the level of input use affects 
production risk is one of main factors influencing 
farmers' behaviour. An input is risk-reducing 
(increasing) if an increase in its use reduces 
(augments) the variance of output. If a change in usage 
does not affect these, then it is a risk-neutral input. 
Risk input relationships and risk aversion affect both 
the adoption of practices (participation) under agri-
environmental programmes and compliance decisions. 
The former issues relate to the optimal size of subsidy 
for the adoption of specific practices. In this paper, we 
focus on the latter issue. 
This paper provides a comprehensive framework for 
modelling farmers' compliance decisions in agri-
environmental schemes incorporating continuous 
effort and simultaneous uncertainty. More specifically, 
we treat conservation effort (action taken by farmers 
to improve the environmental outcome under a 
programme) as a continuous variable and assume the 
existence of monitoring, output price and production 
uncertainty. One of the primary advantages of our 
model is that it can examine the effect of risk-input 
relationships on the likelihood of compliance. The 
possibility of correlation between the stochastic 
variables is included. Based on this general framework, 
we derive the optimal level of conservation effort and 
comparative static results under a range of scenarios. 
Our results suggest that if conservation effort is 
either risk-decreasing or risk-neutral, optimal effort 
exerted by a risk-averse farmer is greater than that for 
a risk-neutral farmer. The greater the aversion to risk, 
the greater the effort exerted under monitoring, output 
price, and/or production uncertainty. If conservation 
effort is risk-increasing, however, the optimal level of 
effort can be lower than that exerted by a risk-neutral 
farmer. When conservation effort is risk-increasing, 
the effect of the degree of risk aversion on optimal 
effort is ambiguous. Finally, the covariance of 
stochastic variables affects equilibria for both risk-
neutral and risk-averse farmers. 
The next section presents the theoretical model. In 
section 3, we discuss the relationship between the 
degree of risk aversion and the optimal level of 
conservation effort, approximating the utility function 
by the second-order Taylor expansion. Section 4 




Consider a farmer facing both output price and 
production uncertainty who participates in a voluntary 
agri-environmental scheme (i.e., the participation 
constraint is satisfied). Conservation effort is assumed 
to be costly
3, with the cost to the farmer determined 
by actual direct compliance costs represented by the 
function  and profit forgone represented through 
the production function 
) (e m
) ; , ( ν e x F , where  ] , 0 [ max e e∈  
represents the level of conservation effort, x  is  a 
variable input of production not related to 
conservation effort
4 , and ν is a random variable 
associated with production with mean zero and 
variance  . Following Just and Pope, production 




                                                           
2 Due to space limitations, complete mathematical derivations are 
not given. They are available from the authors on request. 
3 There may be private benefits from conservation effort so that the 
optimal level of effort is non-zero without compliance monitoring. 
Optimal effort depends not only on marginal costs but also on 
marginal private benefits. The inclusion of such benefits would not 
affect the principal conclusions of this paper. 
4 More elaborate specifications can be explored. 
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The deterministic component  relates to output 
level and the stochastic component  relates to 
variability of output. We assume that   for 
,   for    (without loss of 
generality) and the following properties: 
) , ( e x f
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The sign of  e q e q = ∂ ∂ / depends on the nature of a 
conservation practice (effort). If conservation effort is 
ng input, 0 / < ∂ ∂ e q k-neutral, 
/ = ∂ ∂ e q
; if ris
0 ; and if risk-increasing,  0 / > ∂ ∂ e q . We 
lso assume: 
 
< = ∂ xx f x          (4)  
a
0 / > = ∂ ∂ x f x f ,  0
2 ∂ f ,  /
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Again, the sign of the first derivative of q with respect 
 the variable input hinges on risk-input relationships. 
In some cases, conservation effort affects the use of 
variable inputs directly (e.g., rates of fertiliser or 
manure use). Again, for mathematical convenience, 
we focus on the single input case. An alternative 
on of the production function would be 





ν ν ⋅ + = )) ( ( )) ( ( ) ; ) ( ( e x q e x f e x F .            (5) 
The sig depends on 
 
n of  e f = ∂ ∂ / x  and  e x e f f ∂ ∂ / ∂ ∂ / . 
Similarly,  x q ∂ ∂ /  and  e x ∂ ∂ / determ e the sign of the 
first derivative of q with respect to conser
in
  vation effort. 
For example, since pesticide is likely to be a risk-
reducing input through its impact on yield (i.e., 
0 / < ∂ ∂ x q ), conservation effort that decreases the use 
of pesticide (i.e.,  0 / < ∂ ∂ e x ) can be regarded as risk-
increasing (i.e.,  0 / > ∂ ∂ e q ). Let p denote the 
(exogenous) output price which is assumed to be 
uncertain and to have the form  ε + = p p , where  p  is 
the expected output price and ε is a stochastic variable 
with mean zero and variance  . 
2
ε σ
The scheme provides incentive payments to farmers 
to engage in conservation activities. After a contract is 
signed, a participating farmer may choose not to exert 
the level of effort,  ] , 0 [ max e e∈ , required by the AEA 
due to the costs of doing so. We assume that a certain 
proportion of farmers enrolled in the scheme are 
inspected randomly during a given period (i.e., there is 
incomplete monitoring) and if non-compliance is 
detected, a penalty is imposed according to the penalty 
function, ) , ( z e e − ρ , which is continuously 
differentiable at ] , 0 [ e , decreasing in e  (i.e., 
0 / < ∂ ∂ e ρ  ),   ,  0 /
2 2 = ∂ ∂ e ρ 0 (.) > ρ  for  e e < , and 
0 ) , 0 ( = z ρ .   is a vector of parameters that determine 
the size of the penalty factor for non-compliance. We 
also assume that monitoring is perfect in that if a 
farmer is inspected, the level of conservation effort 
will be observed accurately
z
5. Hence, the farmer faces 
monitoring uncertainty only due to incomplete 
monitoring (i.e., whether inspected or not inspected). 
The farmer is assumed to have a von-Neuman-
Morgenstern utility function,   ) (π U  defined for profit   
π and to seek to maximize expected utility. According 
to (2), (3) and the penalty factor function defined at 
] , 0 [ e , the farmer never exerts more effort than the 
required level, and thus faces inequality constraints 
implicitly. With these assumptions and denoting the 
probability of inspection
6  by  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ θ  which  is 
assumed to be independent of ε   and ν , the farmer's 
                                                           
5  In general, monitoring is likely to be imperfect (i.e., it is difficult 
to measure conservation effort accurately). We do not examine this 
issue in this paper. 
6  We assume that the probability of inspection is independent of 
prior behaviour (i.e., participating farmers who have previously 
been found not to be in compliance are no more likely to be 
inspected than other farmers). Harrington [15], Friesen [16], and 
Fraser [17] investigate state-dependent monitoring using dynamic 
game models. They find that state-dependent (two/three groups) 
audit schemes can provide cost savings for an AEA. 
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expected utility maximization problem based on 
equation (1) can be expressed as : 
 




U E U E U E π θ π θ π εν εν + − =  
s.t.   and  0 ≥ x e e ≤ ≤ 0 ,                                   (6) 
 
where  E  and    are the expectation operator 
defined over 
εν E
θ , and ε  and ν respectively, 
 
) ( ) , , ( e m wx e x pF s
NI − − + = ν π , and          (7) 
) , ( ) ( ) , , ( z e e s e m wx e x pF s
I − − − − + = ρ ν π .  (8) 
 
The superscripts NI and I indicate “not inspected” and 
“inspected” respectively, and   for 
j π } , { I NI j =  
denotes profit for each case; s   represents a fixed 
incentive payment under the scheme; and w  is  a 
known input price. Although the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions can be derived, because we are interested in 
how the optimal level of conservation effort is affected 
by changes in parameters in the objective function 
(e.g., risk aversion), we focus on e   and its interior 
solution. The first-order necessary condition is
7: 
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e e e m q f p Γ ≡ − + + ) )( ( ν ε  and ) )( ( ν ε e e q f p + +  
. Maximization of the objective 
function requires the following sufficient second-order 
condition be satisfied: 
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e e s m Γ ≡ − − ρ
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7  If we employ (5) instead of (1), conservation effort is a control 
variable. However, the first-order condition with respect to 
conservation effort does not rely on the form of the production 
function, i.e., (1) or (5). 
Since    for  0 < Γ
j
e } , { I NI j = ,   
2 2 ) ( /
j U U j j π
π π ∂ ∂ =
0 ≤  for  } , { I NI j =   is sufficient for (10) to hold.  
Applying the expectation operator in (7) and using the 
expression for the approximate covariance (Bohrnstedt 
and Goldberger [18]), the first-order necessary 
condition can be rewritten as: 
 
e e e f
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where  ] [ ] [ ) 1 ( I NI U E U E
π εν π εν θ θ + − = Φ . We first 
cus on the risk-neutral farmer’s optimal choice. 





Lemma 1:  Suppose a farmer is risk-neutral, the 
optimal level of co
fo
e e e e q Cov f p m s ) , ( ν ε ρ θ − − = − . 
 
r is risk-neutral,  I NI U
π π U = Proof: If a farme . Hence,  
[ 1 / ] = Φ I U E
π εν NI π  a  
const 0




] [ ) ; ( = = ε ε εν π π E U U Cov j j  for  } , { I NI j =  
and  0 ] [ ) ; ( = = ν ν εν π π E U U Cov j j  for  {NI j } ,I = . 




From this lemma, if two stochastic variables affecting 
price and production are uncorrelated, the optimal 
level of effort exerted by a risk-neutral farmer is 
determined where the marginal reduction in the 
d penalty (the marginal benefit of effort: MBE), 
e sρ θ − equals marginal total co  costs (the 
marginal cost of effort: MCE), 
mpliance
e e f p m − . However, 
when the two stochastic variables are not independent 
and conservation effort has an effect on production 
risk, even a risk-neutral farmer will take account of the 
correlation between ε and ν , and risk-input 
relationships, which influence expected profit. Note 
that even if each producer is a price taker the output of 
individual producers could be correlated with output 
price due to a positive correlation between the 
12
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stochastic outputs of all producers (Grant [19]). For 
example, if bad weather or disease causes a reduction 
in aggregate output rather than the output of just some 
farmers, output price may increase. Thus the 
correlation between ε andν  is expected to be either 
zero or negative. 
The next question is how a negative covariance 
affects a risk-neutral farmer’s choices. If  0 > e q , (i.e., 
risk-increasing), the last term of the right-hand side of 
the equation in Lemma 1,  e q Cov ) , ( ν ε −   , can be 
interpreted as the additional marginal cost of effort 
(expected profit decreases as effort increases). In this 
case, the optimal level of effort for a risk-neutral 
farmer decreases because the MCE increase hile the 
MBE remains unchanged. Let 
N e0  and 
N
c e  be  the 
optimal conserva xerted by a l 
farmer (N) when , (
s w
tion effort  -neutra
=
e  risk
0 ) ν ε Cov nd when  0 ) , ( a < ν ε Cov   
respectively. Assuming  ee q gure 1 illustrates this 
situation. Meanwhile, if 0 < e q (i.e., risk-reducing), 
ed profit increases as effort increases,   
e q Cov ) , (
0 =  
since expect
fi
ν ε   can be interpreted as the additional 
marginal benefit of e on 
in Lemma 1 as: 
ffor  rearrangi t (by ng the equati
e e e e f p m q Cov s − = + − ) , ( ν ε ρ θ  ). 
Thus, the optimal level of effort for a risk-neutral 
farmer increases because the MBE increases while the 
MCE remains unchanged. This case is depicted in 
figure 2. 
 
f a negative covariance on the 
ptimal level of effort if   
 
el of effort for 
 
f a negative covariance on the 
ptimal level of effort if 
more 
onservation effort than a risk-neutral farmer. 
Proof: Under
   
Figure 1: The impact o
o 0 > e q
Now, we shall discuss the optimal lev
 risk-averse farmer under uncertainty.  a
   
Figure 2: The impact o
o 0 < e q  
 
Proposition 1:  Under monitoring and output price 
uncertainty, a risk-averse farmer exerts 
c
 
 only price and monitoring uncertainty 
0 ) , ( = ν ε Cov . Therefore, as discussed above, the 
optimal level of effort exerted by  eutral farmer 
is dete  where the MBE, e s
a risk-n
rmined ρ θ − , equals the 
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concave in profit and  , then we know tha
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π
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] [ I U E
π εν = , and  . Also,  1 / ] [ > Φ I U E
π εν ) ; ( ε
π
j U Cov  
for  } , { I NI j =  is negative. Thus, the MBE for a risk-
averse farmer (MBE
A) is higher than that for a risk-
neutral farmer (MBE
N), and the MCE for a risk-averse 
farmer (MCE
A) is smaller than that for a risk-neutral 
farmer (MCE
N). This suggests that by taking account 
of a risk premium a risk-averse farmer exerts more 
conservation effort than a risk-neutral farmer under 
monitoring and output price uncertainty. Q.E.D. 
0  emax e  
N e0   N
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Let   and    be the optimal conservation effort 
exerted by a risk-neutral farmer (N) and a risk-averse 
farmer (A) respectively. Figure 3 illustrates the 
situations identified by Proposition 1. 
N e
A e
   
Figure 3: The impact of changes in risk aversion on the 
optimal level of effort under monitoring and output price 
uncertainty 
 
Proposition 2:  Under simultaneous monitoring, 
output price and production uncertainty with 
0 ) , ( = ν ε Cov , if conservation effort is risk-neutral or 
risk-reducing, a risk-averse farmer with a Just and 
Pope production function exerts more effort than a 
risk-neutral farmer. However, if conservation effort is 
risk-increasing, the impact of risk aversion on the 
optimal level of conservation effort will be reduced. 
Compared to the risk-neutral case, the optimal level of 
conservation effort exerted by a risk-averse farmer 
can be higher, the same or lower. 
 
Proof: If  0 ) , ( = ν ε Cov , e e e f p m s − = − ρ θ  should hold 
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e q












) ; ( ) ; ( ) 1 ( ν θ ν θ
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If  0 ≤ e q , then since  ) ; ( ε
π
j U Cov  and  ) ; ( ν
π
j U Cov  
for  } , { I NI j =  are negative, again the MBE
A is higher 
than MBE
N, and MCE
A is smaller than MCE
N. Thus, if 
0 ) , ( = ν ε Cov  and  0 ≤ e q , the optimal level of 
conservation effort exerted by a risk-averse farmer 
facing output price, production and monitoring 
uncertainty is higher than that exerted by a risk-neutral 
farmer (it is also equal to or higher than that exerted 
by a risk-averse farmer facing only monitoring and 
output price uncertainty because the MBE
A curve in 
figure 3 shifts upwards). However, if   (risk-
increasing): 
0 > e q
 
0












U Cov p U Cov p I NI ν θ ν θ
π π . 
 
Therefore, the optimal level of conservation effort 
exerted by a risk-averse farmer facing simultaneous 
monitoring, output and price uncertainty is at a 
maximum equal to that exerted by a risk-averse farmer 
facing only monitoring and output price uncertainty 
because the MCE
A curve in figure 3 shifts upwards. 
We can not conclude that the optimal effort for a risk-
averse farmer is higher than that for a risk-neutral 
farmer. There is a possibility that a risk-averse farmer 
will exert less effort than a risk-neutral farmer. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3:  Under simultaneous monitoring, 
output price and production uncertainty with 
0 ) , ( < ν ε Cov , if conservation effort is risk-neutral, a 
risk-averse farmer exerts more effort than a risk-
neutral farmer. If conservation effort is risk-reducing, 
the optimal effort exerted by a risk-averse farmer 
facing  0 ) , ( < ν ε Cov  is greater than that exerted by a 
farmer facing 0 ) , ( = ν ε Cov . In addition, if 
conservation effort is risk-increasing, the optimal 
conservation effort of a farmer facing  0 ) , ( < ν ε Cov  is 
smaller than a farmer facing  0 ) , ( = ν ε Cov . 
 
Proof: If  0 = e q , the optimal condition for a risk-
averse farmer is as in Proposition 1. If  0 < e q  and 
0 ) , ( < ν ε Cov , 
 
0  emax e  
A e  











th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008   7 
e q










− ) ; ( ) ; ( ) 1 ( ν θ ν θ
π π  
e q














) ; ( ) ; ( ) 1 (
) ; (





Compared to the case when random variables are 
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Thus, compared to the independent (zero covariance) 
case, the optimal level of effort exerted by a risk-






However, when  0 ) , ( < ν ε Cov  and  0 ≠ e q , we can not 
conclude that a risk-averse farmer exerts more effort 
 risk-neutral farmer. Nevertheless, we find that 
h risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers, when 
he optimal level of effort is greater than when 
0 > e q   (except for a risk-neutral farmer with 
0 ) , ( =
than a
for bot
t 0 < e q
ν ε Cov ). This suggests that the AEA should 
target enforcement efforts to farmers who are required 
to adopt risk-increasing conservation practices under 
agri-environmental schemes. For risk-decreasing 
practices, 
III. THE DEGREE OF RISK AVERSION AND 
O
ity can be approximated by a 
The Taylor’s expansion of the utility function 
around expected profit is: 
 
moral hazard is less problematic.  
PTIMAL LEVEL OF CONSERVATION EFFORT 
To investigate how the degree of risk aversion 
affects the optimal level of conservation effort, we 
assume that expected util
second order Taylor’s expansion. Again we focus on e 
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∞
=
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re  ! t   is the factorial of t  and  ) (
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t  denotes 
e tth derivative of the utility function at the point   th
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here  denotes the variance of profit. Expected 
profit can be expressed as: 
 
             (14) 
w
w π σ  
] ) , ( )[ 1 ( ∫∫ − = A
NI d d E ν ε ν ε ζ π θ π
] ) , ( [∫∫ + A
I d d ν ε ν ε ζ π θ , 
 
here  A is a set in two-dimensional space,  A ∈ ) , ( ν ε , 
nd a   ) , ( ν ε ζ  is the joint probability density function of 
ε  and ν . Equation (14) can be rewritten as
 
: 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ν ε π Cov e x q e x f p s E + + =             (15) 
) , ( ) ( z e e s e m wx − − − − ρ θ . 
 
The variance of profit can be expressed as: 
 
   (16) 
This expression can be also rewritten as: 
 
∫∫ − − = A
NI d d E ν ε ν ε ζ π π θ σπ ) , ( } ){ 1 (
2 2     
∫∫ − + A
I d d E ν ε ν ε ζ π π θ ) , ( } {
2 . 
 
] [ ] [ 2
2 ν
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ε εν σ σ σ ε π E q E q p q p f + + + =   ν
] [ 2 ] [ 2 ] [
2 2 2 ν ε σ σ σ σ ν ε ν ε fqE r fq p r q + + −      (17) 
, 
where  (
2 2 ) )( ( s ρ θ θ − +
 
, ) , ( ), , ( ), ν ε σ σ ν ε Cov r e x q q f f = e x = =  ( r  
is the correlation coefficient between   and ν ε ), and 
) , ( z e e − = ρ ρ . 
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Lemma 2 (Anderson [20]):  Let   and   be 




c b a , , d We assume that the utility function is a powe
which exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA): 
 
version is 
) , ( ) , ( )] )( )( )( [( d c Cov b a Cov d c b a E = Δ Δ Δ Δ  
          ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( c b Cov d a Cov d b Cov c a Cov + + ,
w e  c c E c b b E b a a E a Δ = − Δ = − Δ = − ) ( , ) ( , ) ( and 
From Lemma 2, we obtain: 
 
  
ν ε ν ε σ σ σ σ r + = ,         
and equation (14) becomes: 
 
d d E d Δ = − ) ( . 
 
) , ( ) , ( ] [ ] [
2 2 ν ν ε ε εενν ν ε εν εν Cov Cov E E = = (18) 
2 2 2 ] [ 2 ) , ( ) , ( 2 ν ε ν ε Cov Cov +
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ] [ 2 ν ε εν ν ε π σ σ εν σ σ σ q E q p q p f + + + =  
] [ 2 ] [ 2 ] [
2 2 2 ν ε σ σ σ σ εν ν ε ν ε fqE r fq p r q + + +     (19) 
 
2 2 ) )( ( s ρ θ θ − + . 
For mathematical convenience, we assume that ε  and 
ν   have a bivariate nor
vanish (Bohrnstedt and Goldberger [1 ) and 
. Finally, the variance of 
profit is: 
 
  mal distribution. All third 
moments  8]
] [ ] [
2 2 ν ε εν εν εν E E =   0 =
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ] [ ν ε ν ε ν ε π σ σ σ σ σ σ σ r q q q p f + + + =   (20) 
2 2 ) )( ( ] [ s r fq p ρ θ θ ν ε − + . 
 
2 σ σ +
hen W   ε  and  ν   are independently distributed 
(i.e., ), the variance of profit is:  0 = r
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ) )( ( s q q p f ρ θ θ σ σ σ σ σ ν ε ν ε π − + + + = . (21) 
 






) ( )) ( ( max π σ π π π ⋅ ′ ′ + = U U U E E E       (22) 
e
s.t.  0 ≥ x  and  e e ≤ ≤ 0 . 
 
r function 




The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant relative risk 
1 δ
δ − =
− δ − = ′
) (
− − − = ′ ′
δ δW W U . 
a δ = ′ ′ ′ − ) ( / ) ( W U W W U , and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ δ . 
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition 
















                              (24) 








⋅ ′ ′ ′ + E U
E














Rearranging equation (24) we obtain: 
 
e
r q f p m s e e e e ∂
∂









2 2 ) 1 ( ) 2 / 1 ( ) (
) ( ) 2 / 1 (
) (







, and       (26)
 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
] [ 2 2 2 2 ν ε ν ε ν ε
π σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ
r qq qq p qq ff
e




e e e s q f q f ρρ θ θ σν ε
2 2) ( 2 ] [ 2 − + + + .       (27) 
 
If a farmer is risk-ne
r p σ
utral ( 0 = δ ) then (25) reduces to 
ν εσ σ ρ θ r q f p m s e e e e − − = − . If a farmer is risk-
averse ( 0 > δ ), the optimal level of conservation effort 
aversion represents attitude to risk (the power utility 
function), under monitoring and output price 
should satisfy (25). 
A. Comparative Static Analysis 
 
Proposition 4: Suppose that the utility function can be 
approximated by a second-order Taylor series 
expansion about the mean, and constant relative risk 
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uncertainty, as a farmer becomes more risk-averse, 
ceteris paribus, the optimal level of conservation effort 
creases if the following condition is satisfied: 




δ σ π π
2 / 1 ) 2 / 1 ( > E . 
 
P
0 ) ( 2 2
2 2 2
2
< − + =
∂
∂
e s ρρ θ θ σε . 
 




δ   (the right side of the equation 
(25) becomes smaller), the optimal level of 
onservation effort becomes larger with increasing 




2 / 1 2 / 1
] ) 1 (δ δ ∂
. 
 
Therefore, if  δ σ π
2 / 1 ) 2 / 1 ( > E
) 2 / 1 ( ) [(










E E E ∂
π ,  0 / > ∂ Ψ ∂ δ  and  as 
e Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant relative risk 
reases. Q.E.
 seems that  2 / 1 ( l relative to expected 
rofit, particularly when 
th
aversion increases, the optimal level of conservation 
effort also inc D. 
 
Proposition 4 is consistent with the result in Fraser [9]. 
δ σ
2 / 1 )  is smal It
p
π
δ  is close to zero. Also, if 
 applies, then:  δ σ π π






π 2 / 1 ) 2 / 1 ( <
CV
,                     (28) 
 
where    is the coefficient of variation of profit. 







2 / 1 ) 2 / 1 (
1
.                      (29) 
 
Since  1 ) 2 / 1 (
2 / 1 < δ , the coefficient of variation of 
profit becomes greater than unity, which is infeasible. 
 
Proposition 5:  Suppose the utility function can be 
approximated by -order Taylor series 
expansion about the mean, and the constant relative 
risk aversion represents attitude to risk  wer 




uncertainty with  ( = 0 ) ν ε Cov , as a farmer becomes 
ore risk-averse, ceteris paribus, the optimal level of  m




δ σ π π
2 / 1 2 2 / 1 ) ( ) 2 / 1 ( > E
0 ) , ( = ν ε Cov  and  , (27) becomes: 
 
0 ≤ e q
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 ε
π σ e e p qq ff
e






2 2 s . 
 
if 
0 ) ( 2 < − + e ρρ θ θ
According to Proposition 4,  δ σ π π
2 / 1 2 2 / 1 ) ( ) 2 / 1 ( > E , 
0 / > ∂ Ψ ∂ δ . Thus, if 0 ≤ e q and 
2 / 1 2 2 / 1 ) ( ) 2 / 1 ( π σ π > E  
δ , a more risk-averse farmer exerts more conservation 
effort. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 6:  Suppose the utility function can be 
approximated b d-or Taylo ri y a secon der  r se es 
expansion about 
itoring, price and output 
ncertainty with 
the mean, and the constant relative 
risk aversion represents attitude to risk (the power 
utility function, under mon
u 0 ) , ( = ν ε Cov , if  0 > e q and  > π E  
δ σπ
2 / 1 2 2 / 1 ) ( ) 2 / 1 ( , a more risk-averse farmer exerts 
more conservation effort if: 
 
] ) ( [ ] [
2 2 2 2 2 2
e e e s ff qq p ρρ θ θ σ σ σ ε ν ε − + − < + , 
 
and less conservation effort if: 
 
] ) ( [ ] [
2 2 2 2 2 2
e e e s ff qq p ρρ θ θ σ σ σ ε ν ε − + − > + . 
 
he optimal level of conservation effort is not affected  T
by the degree of risk aversion if: 
 
] ) ( [ ] [
2 2 2 2 2 2
e e e s ff qq p ρρ θ θ σ σ σ ε ν ε − + − = + . 
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Also if the equality holds, the optimal level of effort is 
the same as that for the risk-neutral farmer. 
 
Proof: If  0 ) , ( = ν ε Cov , (27) reduces to: 
 
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 ν ε ν ε
π σ σ σ e qq
e
+ =   2 2 σ
σ
e e p qq ff +
∂
∂
+ e s ρρ θ θ
2 2) − . 
 
( 2
Let  A qqe = +
2 2 2 ] ν ε σ σ and 
2 2 2 ) ( [ s ffe θ θ σε − + −  
B e = ]
p [
ρρ . If B A< ,  0 /
2 < ∂ ∂ e π σ . Therefore, if  > π E  
δ σπ
2 / 1 2 2 / 1 ) ( ) 2 / 1 ( , the optimal level of conservation 
effort becomes larger as δ  increases. Similarly, when 
B A > , optimal conservation effort decreases. In 
addition, if  B A = , the last term of the right-hand side 
of (25) vanishes. Q.E.D. 
 
position 6 implies that if conservation effort is risk-
increasing but the randomness associated with 
production is sufficiently small, then an increase in the 
degree of risk aversion can ameliorate the problem of 
moral hazard. However, if the variance of 
Pro
ν is high, as 
δ   increases, optimal conservation effort becomes 
smaller. Therefore, the AEA should be particularly 
concerned abou ndom variation 
in production is expected to be high. This is 
pa
lem of moral hazard. However, 
w
o be especially problematic. 
Moreover, when random variation in production is 
high, as may be th arginal production 





t moral hazard when ra
rticularly relevant for the use of agri-environmental 
programmes in more marginal production areas. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
Risk aversion has been viewed as being likely to 
diminish the moral hazard problem in agri-
environmental schemes. However, the model 
developed in this paper predicts that the impact of risk 
aversion on compliance varies. We explore this for 
monitoring, output price and production uncertainty. 
If the only sources of uncertainty are in monitoring 
and output price, the optimal level of conservation 
effort of a risk-averse farmer is higher than that for a 
risk-neutral farmer. But under monitoring, output price 
and production uncertainty, the relationship between a 
conservation practice and production risk plays an 
important role in determining the impact of risk 
aversion on compliance. If conservation effort has 
risk-reducing or risk-neutral effects on production, risk 
aversion can increase the optimal level of conservation 
effort, and an increase in the degree of risk aversion 
can reduce the prob
hen conservation effort is risk-increasing, the effect 
of risk aversion on optimal effort is, at a minimum, 
reduced. If random variation in production is high, risk 
aversion may decrease the optimal level of 
conservation effort. 
The implications of these results are that an AEA 
needs to pay attention to the amount of uncertainty 
that producers face and the degree of risk aversion, 
and in particular, how the practices required under 
agri-environmental programs affect risk. Conservation 
practices which are risk-increasing, for example, by 
requiring reductions in the use of inputs that reduce 
yield variation seem t
e case in more m
g farmers’ c
requirements of agri-environmental schemes becomes 
easingly important. 
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